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cylinder is at times affected. Intravenous injection of chloralhydrate, and complete chloroform narcosis, are accompanied by the same changes, though, in the case of chloral, of less degree. Stimulation of motor areas with an interrupted current has produced also beading of the cell fibrils, with shrinkage of the cell, and a change to a more or less globular shape.

The relation of the whole question to the present theories of contact of cells in function, and possibly also to the phenomena of fatigue, over-exertion and sleep, is pointed out by the author.

COLIN C. STEWART.

- (4) *Psychology of the Moral Self*. By B. BOSANQUET. London, Macmillan & Co., 1897, pp. viii+132.

In this work Mr. Bosanquet treats of modern psychological conceptions in their bearing upon ethical problems, with special reference to the modern doctrines of apperception and 'vital series.' In its more psychological aspect the book has two main theses: (1) mind is continuous, not discrete, as the atomism of the associationists would have it, or, more accurately, as the neo-Hegelians represent the associationists to hold; (2) mind on its intellectual side can all be expressed in terms of identity and difference, and has resulted from the differentiation of an original unity into the diversity of present experience.

These principles find concrete form in the definitions of processes. Perception, *e. g.*, is defined as 'the blending of ideal elements by identity, with the objective presentation after the two have passed through a thorough opposition to each other.' 'This blending through identity of points in the contents means a judgment.' Space and time arise when 'experience has enabled us to differentiate them out of the original vague continuum' and the 'essence of their perception depends on the formation within the psychical continuum of groups that have phases.' The explanation of assimilation, discrimination and apperception follows Mr. Stout very closely in the doctrine of 'vital series' and the formation of systems, but they are finally brought under the universal category of identity and difference in the sentence, 'All cognition is identity asserting itself.'

A most ingenious combination of modern psychological doctrines with the Hegelian standpoint is to be found in the two chapters on volition, and the one entitled Reasonable Action. The ideo-motor theory of volition is accepted in its entirety, and is stated in the general principle that ideas tend to realize themselves in action. Viewed in the large, volition is a realization of the self. Now the self is not an abstract unrelated entity, but a system of ideas, many of which have reference to others, so that in realizing itself the individual works at once for its own good and the good of the community at large—is at once egoistic and altruistic without being aware of the distinction. Reasonable action is defined to be 'action' in accordance with the whole systematized self or experience. Stated in Hegelian language it becomes 'the actual identification of the private self with the universal self, the actual surrender of the will to the greater will of the system to which we belong.' In the concluding chapter on Body and Soul the same tendency is shown. All other current views of the relation are rejected in favor of the one that makes the mind the ideality of the body. The puzzle has arisen from hypostatizing the two abstractions, mind and matter. To solve the problem we must go back to the given, which is at once subjective and objective. The position re-

minds one forcibly of Wundt's principle that the datum of experience is both physical and psychical.

In spite of its many interesting features the work as a whole is disappointing. One feels constantly that any views which supplement current theory belong rather to a metaphysics than to a psychology of morals. We are at once impressed with the fact that neo-Hegelianism has more to give psychology in helping to frame a point of view than many had supposed, but that to adopt its methods of thought would be disastrous to the science.

The exposition is involved and at times illogical. Conclusions are hinted at rather than stated, and the arguments abound in ellipses which are hard to fill. Aside from these imperfections of form the difficulties of the reader are increased by the curious way in which the author presupposes a knowledge of metaphysics, when he is expounding the most familiar psychological theories with great minuteness. It will never be a popular book, and contains little that is new for the specialist.

W. B. PILLSBURY.

BOOK NOTES.¹

(G. S. H.)

- (5) *Buddhism in Translation*. By HENRY CLARKE WARREN. Cambridge, Mass., 1895, pp. 520.

This is the third in the Harvard Oriental Series edited by Prof. C. R. Lanman, and consists of translations of carefully chosen Pali texts illustrating the chief tenets of Buddha, including sentient existence, Karma, Nirvana, and the religious orders.

- (6) *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*. By BORDEN P. BOWNE, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. N. Y., Harper & Bros., 1897, pp. 389.

"The root thought of the work is that thought is an organic activity which unfolds from within, and can never be put together mechanically from without. Persons on the sense plane perpetually seek to build up thought from without by the mechanical juxtaposition and association of sense impressions. This is the perennial source of that unthinking thinking which tends to deprive thought of all authority and finally to dissolve it into a shadow of physical mechanism." This is a serious, able, logical work, showing great growth in range and vigor of thought since the author's last publication, and with none of the old contempt for those whose preponderating interest inclines them to approach philosophical problems from other standpoints. It is the best introduction we know to the problem, "What should we think about reality?"

- (7) *The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*. By WILLIAM JAMES. Longmans, Green & Co., N. Y., 1897, pp. 332.

It is good to have the chief papers and lectures since 1880 of the most brilliant and literary of American psychologists brought together in a tasteful volume. The humor of "On Some Hegelianism," the pathos of "Is Life Worth Living?" the symbolic relation of

¹ Notice under this heading does not preclude a fuller review later.